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Admiral H. G. Rickover, in his recent thesis on American edu-
cation, has warned the nation that in order that it be assured of enough
educated people our society will have to underwrite at least part of
the cost of higher education.' A tax-supported school system offers
itself as one approach to this problem.2 Unfortunately, however, legal
education only in rare instances has attracted the great, tax-deductible
endowments often left for other purposes; nor has it received sub-
stantial amounts of governmental support." In addition, the question
of the deductibility of expenses incurred in obtaining a legal education,
basic as well as continuing, has been accompanied by uncertainty and
confusion, and compounded by a vast diversity of factual situations
which have given rise to these controversies. 4
In the last few years, the United States has become increasingly
conscious of its educational program and policies.5 This concern has
been stimulated by cold war developments and the apparently increased
power of the Soviet Union relative to the United States.' Simulta-
* Member of the Florida Bar; Lecturer of Law, Graduate Division, University of
Miami, Florida.
1 Rickover, American Education-A National Failure 243 (1963).
2 A clearly defined answer to the problems of increasing school revenues is hard to
find. Local taxation has just about hit the saturation point causing schoolmen, who
recognize the acute need, to look more to state and federal support. "How Broad Should
a Broadened Tax Base Be?" 71 Nation's Schools 65 (1963).
3 Crotty, "Law School Salaries-A Threat to Legal Education," 6 Legal Ed. 166,
169 (1953).
4 Crane, "Law School Education Expenses After Welsh v. United States," 11
Loyola L. Rev. 307 (1963); Goldman, "Recent Decision on Educational Expenses
Arouses Controversy; Liberal Trend Slowed," 17 J. Taxation 40 (1962); Ruffner,
"Deductability of the Expenses of Obtaining a Law Degree," 17 U. Miami L. Rev.
424 (1963).
r See, e.g., Commission on Financing Higher Education, Nature and Needs of Higher
Education (1952); Conant, The American High School Today (1959); Conference
on Legal Education, The Law Schools Look Ahead (1959); Harno, Legal Education in
the United States (1953); Harris, Higher Education Resources and Finance (1962);
Keezer, Financing Higher Education: 1960-1970 (1959); Machlup, The Production
and Distribution of Knowledge in the United States (1963) ; Nicholson, The Law Schools
of the United States (1958); Warkov, Lawyers in the Making: The 1961 Entrants
to American Law Schools (1963); Becker, "Underinvestment in College Education?"
50 Am. Econ. Rev. 346 (1960); Harno, "American Legal Education," 46 A.BAJ. 845
(1960).
6 Note, "Federal Tax Incentives for Higher Education," 76 Harv. L. Rev. 369 (1962).
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neously, it has been recognized that sending children to college in-
volves for most families an extraordinary financial burden, and that
this burden will grow as hard-pressed institutions find it necessary
to increase tuitions in order to support higher faculty salaries and
other increased costs. 7
Since 1920 the enrollment in higher education has increased 500
percent, while law school enrollment has increased less than 75 per-
cent.' A 1960 American Bar Association survey found that only slightly
over two million dollars was available for law scholarships throughout
the country, nine schools controlling more than half of these funds.'
Despite the lag of financial support for legal education, relative to
higher education generally, law degrees awarded rose from 7,937 in
1955 to 9,073 in 1960. Less than one-third of this number received
public support.'0 It is estimated that for the 1967-70 period the net
cost of a three-year law school education will be 9,000 dollars," and
some now urge that federal aid is inevitable.1
In the first session of the 87th Congress, a variety of bills seeking
to grant tax relief to students or their parents were introduced;"
this year, a tax credit proposal which would have provided certain
tax benefits to parents paying college tuition and fees for their children
was narrowly defeated. A companion bill was also defeated in a tie
7 United States President's Committee on Education Beyond High School, Second
Report to the President 11 (1957). The U.S. Office of Education, in a new study, says
that between the 1958-59 and the 1962-63 school years, the median tuition for under-
graduates at 851 private colleges and universities rose from $534 to $740; among 514
state colleges and universities studied, the median increase was $49 for state residents
and $11 for out-of-state residents. The survey found that fewer than one in five pri-
vate institutions were able to hold increases to $100 or less. See generally Economics of
Higher Education (Mushkin ed. 1962), covering a wide range of problems, including
the nation's requirements for college-trained people, and detailed questions of financing.
8 See ABA Special Committee to Study Current Needs in the Field of Legal Educa-
tion 4 (1961); cf. Smith, "Admissions to the Bar in 1958 and 1959: Has the Downward
Trend Been Reversed?" 46 A.B.A.J. 1201 (1960).
9 ABA Special Committee to Study Current Needs in the Field of Legal Education
11 (1961); Note, "Modern Trends in Legal Education," 64 Colum. L. Rev. 710, 732
(1964).
10 Ibid.
11 Cavers, "A Proposal: Legal Education in Two Calendar Years," 49 AB.A.J'.
475, 480 (1963).
12 Note, "Federal Tax Incentives for Higher Education," supra note 6; But see
N.Y. Times, July 19, 1964, p. E7, col. 1, for the new platform of the Republican party
cutting school aid proposals.
I3 H.R. 331, H.R. 1836, H.R. 1837, H.R. 3521, H.R. 3549, H.R. 7379, H.R. 8717,
H.R. 9067, H.R. 9222, H.R. 9373, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961). See generally Meck,
"The Tax Credit Proposal," Higher Education in the United States 93 (Harris ed. 1960).
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vote. That bill would have provided for the income tax exemption of
the first 1,200 dollars of the annual earnings of undergraduates, and
1,500 dollars of the earnings of post-graduate students.14
We will examine both the federal tax aspects of education expenses
and the suggestion that those expenses be amortized.' 5
DEDUCTIBILITY OF EDUCATIONAL EXPENSES
With increased awareness of the value of a more learned citizenry,
allowing the deductibility of educational expenses has received added
attention. 6 The Internal Revenue Service normally denominates such
expenditures personal and thus nondeductible under the Internal Reve-
nue Code,' 7 while taxpayers fight to treat them as deductible business
expenditures.' To be deductible, the expenses must be "ordinary
and necessary,"' 9 and the taxpayer must be engaged in a trade or
business. 20
In general, the theory of the Treasury Regulations is that in
order for any educational expense to be deductible it must either be
(1) incurred to maintain or improve skills required by the taxpayer
in his employment or other trade or business, or (2) be an express
requirement of the taxpayer's employer or applicable law or regula-
tions, imposed as a condition to the retention of the taxpayer's salary,
status, or employment. 2' If it is "customary for other established
14 N.Y. Times, Feb. 4, 1964, p. 1, col. 2.
15 The 1953 proposal appears to have been revived. See Goode, "Educational Ex-
penditures and the Income Tax," Economics of Higher Education 281 (Muskin ed.
1962). See also the recommendation of Carrol G. Josselyn during the 1953 General
Revenue Revision hearings before the House Ways and Means Committee. Hearings
Before the Committee on Ways and Means, 83d Cong. 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 189 (1953).
16 Chommie, "Federal Income Taxation: Transactions in Aid of Education," 58
Dick. L. Rev. 291 (1954); Chommie, "Services Rendered, Not Donative Intent, Governs
Exemption of Study Grants," 4 J. Taxation 375 (1956); Harrington, "The Deductibility
of Education Expenses Under § 162(a) of the Internal Revenue Code," 4 William &
Mary L. Rev. 55 (1963); Loring, "Some Tax Problems of Students and Scholars," 45
Calif. L. Rev. 153 (1957); Shaw, "Education as an Ordinary and Necessary Expense in
Carrying on a Trade or Business," 19 Tax L. Rev. 1 (1963); Note, "Deduction of Educa-
tional Expenses Under the Internal Revenue Code of 1954," 1 Washburn L. Rev. 440
(1961).
17 Int. Rev. Code of 1954 § 262.
18 Int. Rev. Code of 1954 § 162(a).
19 Ibid.
20 Trent v. Commissioner, 291 F.2d 669 (2d Cir. 1961). Originally, the phrase "trade
or business" was synonymous with any profit-seeking activity. Allen & Orechkoff, "To-
ward a More Systematic Drafting and Interpreting of the Internal Revenue Code:
Expense, Losses, and Bad Debts," 25 U. Chi. L. Rev. 43 (1957).
21 Treas. Reg. §§ 1.162-5(a) (1) & (2) (1958); Rev. Rul. 60-97, 1960-1 Cum. Bull. 69.
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members of the taxpayer's trade or business to undertake such edu-
cation, the taxpayer will ordinarily be considered to have undertaken
this education for the purpose of maintaining or improving a skill
required of him in his employment or other trade or business,"22
although "no deduction is allowed for expenses which are for education
undertaken primarily for the purpose of obtaining a new position, or
primarily for the purpose of fulfilling the general aspirations or other
personal purposes of the taxpayer."2
The Treasury view dates back to 1921. Two rulings then declared
summer school expenses of teachers and postgraduate courses for
doctors to be personal undertakings and nondeductible.24 Five years
later in 1926, the Board of Tax Appeals held voice study expenses
of instruction, travel, and subsistence in anticipation of professional
employment to be personal and nondeductible. 5 In 1933, dictum of
Mr. Justice Cardozo in Welch v. Helvering generated much of the dif-
ficulty in this area of the federal taxation of educational expenses:
[A] man conceives the notion that he will be able to practice his
vocation with greater ease and profit if he has an opportunity to
enrich his culture .... Reputation and learning are akin to capital
assets, like the good will of an old partnership .... The money spent
in acquiring them is well and wisely spent. It is not an ordinary ex-
pense of the operation of a business 26
The case involved a commercial transaction, and the discussion
of educational costs was merely by way of analogy. Justice Cardozo
spoke of that knowledge which is obtained for its own sake as an
addition to one's cultural background or for possible use in some
future work; he did not indicate that he would make no exception
where the skill acquired was needed for one's present vocation.
27
Using Justice Cardozo's "capital asset" conceptualization, it can
be argued that education has an enduring quality; a professor who
invests in an advanced degree should be treated as a factory owner
who adds plant capacity.2 8 Each builds foundations of learning, upon
which their future and earnings are to be based. Yet if education or
training is undertaken to prepare oneself for a new vocation or pro-
fession, or to meet the minimum qualifications for any employment,
22 Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5(a) (1958); Rev. Rul. 60-97, 1960-1 Cum. Bull. 69.
23 Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5(b) (1958); Rev. Rul. 60-97, 1960-1 Cum. Bull. 69.
24 O.D. 892, 1921-4 Cum. Bull. 209; O.D. 984, 1921-5 Cum. Bull. 171.
25 T.F. Driscoll, 4 B.T.A. 1008 (1926).
26 Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 115-16 (1933). (Emphasis added.)
27 See Coughlin v. Commissioner, 203 F.2d 307, 309 (2d Cir. 1953).
28 James M. Osborn, 3 T.C. 603 (1944); Richard H. Lampkin, 11 CCH Tax Ct.
Mem. 576-77 (1952); G.C.M. 11657, XII-1 Cum. Bull. 250 (1933).
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there is no deduction.29 The Code does give some relief by excluding
scholarship and fellowship aid from taxable income,30 and parents may
claim a 600 dollars exemption for children over 19 years of age who
are students, if they receive more than half their support from the
parents (even if the children have gross income exceeding 600 dol-
lars). 31
The broad issue is ordinarily whether the particular expense of
education is a personal, capital, or the previously mentioned "ordinary
and necessary" expense of the taxpayer's professional activity.32
While it sometimes appears to be conceded that educational expenses,
following the Cardozo dictum in Welch, are in the nature of capital
expenditures, the courts have not always been consistent in classifying
such expenditures. Presently, however, drawing a distinction between
personal and capital expenses is immaterial because neither generates
a deduction.
In James M. OsbornM3 the Tax Court disallowed the deduction of
an educational expense partially on the theory that it was a nondeduc-
tible capital expenditure. The taxpayer was a research professor at
Yale who received no compensation while he was engaged in literary
research. Most of his time was devoted to the preparation of three
books. Osborn had no immediate prospect of financial profit, but he
did hope to build a reputation for first class scholarship, thus making
himself eligible for highly remunerative professional appointments.
In 1940 he spent some 7,000 dollars on literary research in producing
the books. One of the books was distributed free; another was pub-
lished at the taxpayer's expense in a limited edition; and the third,
unpublished, was expected to show a profit. The Tax Court, citing
Justice Cardozo's dictum, said these expenses were "in essence the cost
of the capital structure from which his future income is to be derived."
The court added "that they cannot be given deductibility for tax pur-
poses in the absence of legislation, where alone deductibility can be
provided." '34
Although the era of reflexive denials of deductions for educa-
tional expenses ended in 1950 when the Fourth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals permitted schoolteacher Nora Payne Hill to deduct her summer
29 Rev. Rul. 60-97, 1960-1 Cum. Bull. 69, 73.
8D Int. Rev. Code of 1954 § 117.
31 Int. Rev. Code of 1954 § 151.
32 See Chommie, "Federal Income Taxation: Transactions in Aid of Education,"
supra note 16.
33 3 T.C. 603 (1944).
34 Id. at 605.
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school expenses, 5 the Tax Court still kept the door closed to most
such deductions.
Knut F. Larson became employed as a mechanic in 1942 with a
company that had suffered a wartime-shortage of skilled personnel.
In September 1943, he registered in the New York University, Eve-
ning Division, School of Engineering, where he thereafter took eve-
ning courses. He continued to work for the same company, and in
1945 was employed as an industrial engineer. He received his degree
of Bachelor of Administrative Engineering in 1948. In disallowing
Larson's petition for redetermination the Tax Court again repeated
Justice Cardozo's dictum. Larson himself had claimed that his studies
and the subsequent academic award would account for increases in
his earning capacity. Since neither the Internal Revenue Code nor the
Treasury Regulations expressly provide that educational costs are to
be treated as capital items,"0 and since the court found that the learn-
ing was "akin to capital assets," the expenses were nondeductible?7
Richard Lampkin was a college professor. He objected to the
assessment of a deficiency resulting from the disallowance of an amount
which he had expended in connection with his doctoral dissertation."
The Tax Court itself suggested that capitalization of the expenditures
might be proper with current recoupment limited to an annual offset
against receipts. This is analogous to a previously permitted method
of amortizing of patents.39
We can see from these illustrative Tax Court cases that on several
occasions the capital nature of education has been recognized. It was
with regard to legal education that the capital asset concept received
its initial setback.
In Coughlin v. Commissioner40 the Tax Court affirmed a deficiency
assessment disallowing the expenses on the grounds that they were
educational and personal and, as such, were not allowable deductions
for federal income tax purposes. Petitioner Coughilin was a lawyer en-
gaged in general practice, but he handled some matters pertaining to
federal taxation. Coughlin regularly attended bar association lectures
designed to keep the practitioner informed on current developments in
85 Hill v. Commissioner, 181 F.2d 906 (4th Cir. 1950), reversing 13 T.C. 291 (1949).
86 See Comment, "Deductibility of Educational Expenses," 6 Stan. L. Rev. 547,
548 n.7 (1954). The costs of basic college education and professional training are not
deductible. Lewis v. Commissioner, 164 F.2d 885 (2d Cir.), affirming 8 T.C. 770 (1947);
T.F. Driscoll, 4 B.T.A. 1008 (1926); J.D. Bowles, 1 B.T.A. 584 (1925).
37 Knut F. Larson, 15 T.C. 956 (1950).
8 Richard H. Lampkin, 11 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 576 (1952).
89 See Associated Patentees, Inc., 4 T.C. 979 (1945).
40 Supra note 27.
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the law. His firm regularly subscribed to various publications, periodi-
cals, and services related to the field of federal taxation; 41 Coughlin
was expected by his partners to keep abreast of the changes and devel-
opments of the law.
In November 1946, Coughlin attended an institute on federal taxa-
tion, sponsored by the Division of General Education of New York
University. The institute was aimed specifically at people who had
done tax work and who had a certain amount of expertise in taxation.42
Students were told that the institute was not designed for their benefit.
In 1946, the institute was attended by 408 attorneys, accountants, and
others, such as trust officers and corporate executives. It was intended
by its sponsors to expose legal practitioners to trends, thinking, and
developments in the field of federal taxation.
In Coughlin the court relied on Hill v. Commissioner,43 which had
allowed the summer school expenses of teachers; however, the Tax
Court pointed out that Hill was limited "to the facts before the court."
It sustained the Commissioner who had based his case on the old 1921
Office Decision disallowing doctors' deductions for postgraduate
courses, 44 and cited Justice Cardozo's dictum to support its holding.
The court of appeals said that if the expenses were "directly connected
with" or "proximately resulted from" Coughlin's practice of his legal
profession they would be deductible.4 5 The court said further that if
it were usual for lawyers in practices similar to Coughlin's to incur
such expenses they would be "ordinary," 4 and if appropriate and help-
ful, "necessary.1 47
41 In Julius I. Peyser, 1 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 807 (1943), a lawyer was allowed the
cost of "current legal publications of short life," and a portion of the upkeep and
expenses of a car used partly in his business.
42 A lawyer may deduct the cost of a two-week course in federal taxation at the
Practicing Law Institute in New York. In July 1948, FM. Bistline and his wife traveled
to New York City, where he enrolled in the tax course and also attended the Lions'
Convention. His travel expenses for the trip to New York and his hotel expenses in-
curred while attending the Institute amounted to $295.20. It was undisputed that his
expenditures for tuition and books totaled $140. The District Court in Idaho held
these amounts deductible as business expenses. Bistline v. United States, 145 F. Supp. 800
(D. Idaho 1956).
43 Supra note 35. See Bowen, "Teachers and Taxes," 32 Taxes 57 (1954).
44 01). 984, 1921-5 Cum. Bull. 171.
45 Coughlin v. Commissioner, supra note 27.
46 An expense is "ordinary" if it is "normal, usual, or customary." Deputy v.
Dupont, 308 U.S. 488, 495 (1939); National Brass Works, Inc. v. Commissioner, 182
F.2d 526, 530 (9th Cir. 1950).
47 "Necessary" has been defined liberally by the Supreme Court to mean "appropriate
and helpful" rather than "indispensible or required." Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S.
111 (1933). See Shaw, supra note 16, at 2.
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In reversing the Tax Court, the Second Circuit held that Cough-
lin's situation was closely akin to that of Nora Hill, the schoolteacher,
and that the only difference was in the degree of necessity which
prompted the incurrence of the expenses. Nora Hill would have been
unable to retain her position as a schoolteacher unless she had compied
with the school's requirements for the renewal of her teaching certif-
icate, and an optional way to do that was for her to attend summer
school at a recognized institution of learning. Here, while Coughlin did
not need to renew his license to practice as an attorney, and while it
may be assumed that he could have continued as a member of his law
firm irrespective of whether or not he kept currently informed on his
federal tax law, he was "morally" bound to keep so informed and he
did so in part by attending the New York University Tax Institute.
The court of appeals, however, distinguished these expenditures
from those made to acquire a capital asset.48 While recognizing Justice
Cardozo's capital analogy, the Second Circuit held that "the rather
evanescent character of that for which the petitioner spent his money
deprives it of the sort of permanency such a concept embraces. ' 49 The
case does not establish a minimum test but merely holds that a partic-
ular fact, i.e., moral compulsion, constitutes sufficient necessity for
deductibility.
In view of the "evanescent character" of this continuing legal
education, an argument has been advanced against Justice Cardozo's
capital asset analogy.5" The ground for the criticism rests on the rea-
soning that if the peculiar characteristic of a capital asset is its endur-
48 Coughlin v. Commissioner, supra note 27. One of the most prolific sources of tax
litigation has been the problem of distinguishing capital expenditures from revenue
charges. Sugarman, "Basic Criteria for Distinguishing Revenue Charges from Capital
Expenditures in Income Tax Computations," 49 Mich. L. Rev. 213 (1950); World Tax
Series, Taxation in the United States 455 (1963).
49 Coughlin v. Commissioner, supra note 27. Professor Chommie has critized the
court for not having been more explicit in either accepting or rejecting the capital
expenditure concept. He also does not believe that the Court was serious in echoing
the fairly common sentiment that tax knowledge is "evanescent." Chommie, "Federal
Income Taxation: Transactions in Aid of Education," supra note 16, at 301.
60 One argument points to the analogy of good will; advertising services are deduc-
tible as "ordinary and necessary" but the end product which it produces, i.e., good will,
is considered as a capital item. Comment, "Deductibility of Educational Expenses,"
6 Stan. L. Rev. 547, 550 (1954). Another writer makes the tenuous distinction that
since tax law changes so frequently, the education that is acquired is too temporary
in character to be considered a capital asset, but that the cost of an attorney taking a
course in the new Uniform Commercial Code could be considered to be more "capital"
in nature. Note, "Cost of Tax Course Deductible as a Business Expense," 102 U. Pa.
L. Rev. 138, 141 (1953).
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ing quality, why should it be necessary for some lawyers and other
professionals to take annual refresher courses? The reasonable infer-
ence would be that whatever is gained loses its value in the period of a
year. Since professional law journals and law books having a short use-
ful life are deductible5 and since a refresher course serves the same
function and usually has a shorter useful life, the courses will have to
be analyzed to determine the permanence of the knowledge acquired
and the extent to which it has improved the taxpayer's capacity in his
field of endeavor.
PRIzES, AWARDs, SCHOLARSHIPS, AND FELLOWSHIPS
The Treasury has changed its approach which seems to indicate
a shift in emphasis with regard to prizes, awards, scholarships, and
fellowships; they have been accorded specialized treatment. Prizes and
awards are, with certain stated exceptions, specifically included in in-
come, whereas scholarships and fellowship grants are, with stated
exceptions, specifically excluded from income. 52
Statutory regulation clarifying the tax treatment of prizes and
awards was deemed necessary in the Code5 3 because of certain decisions
which had previously held prizes awarded in a contest to be nontaxable
gifts rather than taxable income.54 The doctrine of consideration was
the test under the law prior to the 1954 Code which led to the conclu-
sion that a nontaxable gift was received when the lucky winner did
nothing substantial to merit the prize.5 5
The American Bar Association awarded its Ross Essay Prize for
1939 to Malcolm McDermott. The Commissioner ruled that the prize
was taxable as income and the Tax Court sustained the Commissioner.5 6
McDermott, a professor of law, submitted his essay on a topic chosen
by the association. The judges considered McDermott's essay to be the
best and he was awarded the prize and a certificate. 57 In reversing the
51 Louis Boehm, 35 B.T.A. 1106 (1937). See note 41 supra. The Commissioner
permits a life in excess of one year. Dean, "Tax Ideas for Professional Persons," P-H
Tax Ideas ff 5003 (1956). Waisel, "Attorneys' Federal Income Taxes," 66 Dick. L. Rev.
75 (1961); Note, "The Determination of Depreciation Allowances on Professional
Libraries for Income Tax Purposes," 9 Tax L. Rev. 102 (1953).
52 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 74; Treas. Reg. § 1.74-1(a) (1955).
53 See Senate Finance Committee Report, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. (1954); Loring,
"Some Tax Problems of Students and Scholars," 45 Calif. L. Rev. 153, 157 (1957).
54 McDermott v. Commissioner, 150 F.2d 585 (D.C. Cir. 1945); Pauline L. Wash-
burn, 5 T.C. 1333 (1945).
55 Mansfield, "Income from Prizes and Awards and from Scholarships and Fellowship
Grants," 19 N.Y.U. Inst. on Fed. Tax 129, 130 (1961).
56 Malcolm McDermott, 3 T.C. 929 (1944).
57 The American Bar Association was regarded as the payor, and since its intent was
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Tax Court, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals listed eight cir-
cumstances which required the conclusion that the award was a gift
and not taxable. 6 Included among them was the recognition that it had
become a wise and settled policy to exempt such awards from taxation
in order to encourage scholarly work. The Treasury refused to agree,
and subsequent cases have uniformly held that prizes for essays in a
contest are taxable.59
As a result of the decision in McDermott, and another decision,
Pauline L. Washburn,6" in which the taxpayer was a winner on the Pot
of Gold radio program even though she had not been tuned in to the
broadcast, Congress decided to change the rules.61 The Internal Re-
venue Code of 1954 now provides that amounts received as prizes and
awards are included in "gross income. 62 There are two exceptions to
this general rule: (a) a prize or award "made primarily in recognition
of religious, charitable, scientific, educational, artistic, literary or civic
achievement," but only if the taxpayer was selected without having
done anything or taking any action to enter the contest, and provided
also that he or she is not required to do anything "substantial" by way
of future services before becoming entitled to receive the prize or
award; (b) scholarships and fellowship grants.63 As examples of the
first exception, the Treasury Regulations say that "such awards as the
Nobel prize and the Pulitzer prize would qualify for the exclusion." 4
The second exception to the rule of includability is not truly an
exception since it receives special treatment in a separate provision
of the Internal Revenue Code.65 Scholarships and fellowship grants are
now regulated by statute for the first time in the 1954 Code.
Prior to the enactment of section 117 of the 1954 Code, which
now controls the entire question of the taxability of legal and other
scholarship and fellowship grants,66 the tax struggle revolved around
donative and the motive of the taxpayer was nonpecuniary, the award was classified
as a gift. See Note, "Scholarships, Fellowships and Prizes: Gift or Income?" 38 Minn. L.
Rev. 152, 159 (1954).
58 McDermott v. Commissioner, 150 F.2d 585, 586 (D.C. Cir. 1945).
59 I.T. 3960 1949-2 Cum. Bull. 13; United States v. Amirikian, 197 F.2d 442
(4th Cir. 1952); Mansfield, supra note 55, at 131.
60 5 T.C. 1333 (1945).
61 See S. Rep. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 178 (1954).
62 Int. Rev. Code of 1954 § 74(a).
63 Int. Rev. Code of 1954 § 74(b). See Treas. Reg. § 1.74-1(b) (1955); Rev. Rul.
57-19, 1957 Int. Rev. Bull. No. 3, at 7.
64 Treas. Reg. § 1.74-1(b) (1955).
65 Int. Rev. Code of 1954 § 117.
66 Note, "Fellowships and Scholarships, Prizes and Awards-Ante 1954, Post 1954,"
7 Syracuse L. Rev. 130 (1955).
[Vol. 2 7
1966] FEDERAL TAXATION OF LEGAL EDUCATION 127
the question of whether the grant constituted a gift which was exempt
from income taxation. The Internal Revenue Code of 1939 contained
no provision comparable to section 117. Under the 1939 Code the
typical approach was to determine whether or not the amounts so re-
ceived fell within the statutory definition of gross income. Taxation
depended upon whether or not the amounts received were intended as
compensation for services rendered.6 7 If it could be shown that the
amounts received were, in fact, gifts under section 22(b)(3) of the
1939 Code, recipient did not have to include them in his gross income;
if such grants were determined to be in the nature of compensation,
then the opposite result obtained.6" Thus the test was whether a grant
was more properly classified as compensation or a gift.6 9
The Internal Revenue Service in 1951 attempted to set up general
standards to clarify the Commissioner's position with regard to scholar-
ships and fellowship grants.70 Four representative examples involving
recipients of fellowship grants were set forth in the ruling, but in all
four cases the taxpayers were found to have received taxable income
and they were not entitled to exempt any of the awards as gifts. 71 The
Commissioner took the position that in no case were the grants "for the
training or education" of the recipients, which would have made them
taxfree gifts,72 but rather each recipient was required by the grantor, in
exchange for the grant, "to apply his respective skill and training to
advance research or creative work," which made the awards received
taxable income.73
In most cases, the recipient of a fellowship award is involved in
"training or education" and simultaneously hoping thereby "to advance
research, creative work" or to do some other project or activity in ex-
change for his grant.7 4 George W. Stone felt this way when he was
67 The 1954 House Report stated:
When the scholarships and fellowships are granted subject to the perform-
ance of teaching or research services, the exclusion is not to apply to that
portion which represents payments which are in effect a wage or salary.
H.R. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1954).
68 Gordon, "Scholarships and Fellowship Grants as Income: A Search for Treas-
ury Policy," 1960 Wash. U.L.Q. 144, 145.
69 Gordon, "I.R.S.'s Use of Gift-v.-Compensation Test Delays Practical Fellowship
Income Rule," 13 J. Taxation 272 (1960).
70 I.T. 4056, 1951-2 Cum. Bull. 5.
71 Mansfield, supra note 55, at 136.
72 Huberman, "Scholarships, Fellowships and Prizes," 3 Hastings L.J. 116, 118
(1952).
73 Note, "Fellowship Grants Under the Internal Revenue Code of 1954," 8 Buffalo
L. Rev. 286 (1959).
74 Note, "The Taxability of Scholarships and Fellowship Grants, a Student Guide,"
39 Notre Dame Law. 301, 304 (1964).
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awarded his fellowship for the purpose of allowing him to devote his
full time and energies to research for and the preparation of an eight-
volume work on the history of London dramatic performances for the
period 1660 to 1800.75 Dissatisfied with the ruling of the Treasury and
believing that the two concepts were not mutually exclusive, Stone
garnered a majority of the Tax Court,76 despite a previous Supreme
Court decision in favor of the Commissioner.77 Stone's grant was held
to facilitate his further education, and thus was excludable from gross
income.
Many educational institutions were anxious to find more satisfac-
tory standards which would recognize the educational function of tradi-
tional fellowship grants and which would eliminate some of the uncer-
tainty and divergent income tax practices.7 The situation, therefore,
in early 1954 was a confusing one. Congress recognized that the Inter-
nal Revenue Service had "not provided a clear-cut method ' 71 of deter-
mining taxability, and it sought to provide rules in enacting section 117
to stabilize the law in this area.80
Section 117 of the 1954 Code generally provides that amounts re-
ceived as fellowship grants and as scholarships81 at an educational
institution which, under normal circumstances, maintains both a regular
faculty and curriculum, while having a regularly organized body of
students in attendance,"2 are not to be included in the recipient's gross
income. The provision of the Code which excludes gifts8" is specifically
made inapplicable as is the provision respecting prizes and awards, 4
and while this position may raise a question of constitutionality,85 it
emphasizes the congressional intent to subject the taxation of fellow-
ship grants and scholarships to an exclusive set of rules.
75 Weiss, "Taxability of Scholarships and Fellowship Grants," 1963 Duke L.J.
488, 491.
76 George W. Stone, 23 T.C. 254 (1954).
77 Robertson v. United States, 343 U.S. 711 (1952). See I.T. 4056, 1951-2 Cum. Bull.
8.
78 Mansfield, "Income from Prizes and Awards and from Scholarships and Fellow-
ship Grants," 19 N.Y.U. Inst. on Fed. Tax 129, 137 (1961).
79 S. Rep. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 17 (1954).
80 See Chommie, "Services Rendered, Not Donative Intent, Governs Exemption of
Study Grants," 4 J. Taxation 375 (1956).
81 Int. Rev. Code of 1954 § 117(a)(1); Treas. Reg. § 1.117-1(a) (1956), as
amended, T.D. 6456, 1960-1 Cum. Bull. 57-43.
82 Int. Rev. Code of 1954 § 151(e)(4); Rev. Rul. 57-484, 1957-2 Cum. Bull. 113.
83 Int. Rev. Code of 1954 § 102. See Zucker, "Income and Expenses of Visiting
and Traveling Professors," 18 Tax L. Rev. 379, 382 (1963).
84 Treas. Reg. § 1.117-1(a) (1956), as amended, T.D. 6456, 1960-1 Cum. Bull. 43.
85 See Magill, Taxable Income 346 (1936).
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There are some limitations, however, on the amounts which are
excluded under the general rule of section 117. If the person receiving
the scholarship or fellowship grant is a candidate for a degree, he or
she cannot omit from taxation that portion of the award which is com-
pensation for part-time teaching, research, or other similar activity.86
This rule applies even though such teaching is made a condition to the
grant of the scholarship, unless such part-time research, teaching, or
other activity is required by the curriculum for all candidates for that
degree.87 The criterion for determining how much to include in gross
income is what is usually paid for similar services to an individual who
is not an award recipient.8" The fact that the individual receiving the
grant is required to furnish periodic reports to the grantor regarding
his progress is not deemed to constitute performance of services in the
nature of part-time employment.8 9
In contrast to degree candidates, 0 nondegree candidates have
much more extensive and complicated limitations. 9 If the recipient is
not a candidate for a degree, the payments are still excludable from
gross income if the grantor is either a governmental agency or a tax
exempt private organization as defined in section 501 (c) (3) ;0 but the
amount is limited to 300 dollars a month for a maximum period of 36
86 Oliver, "Treatment of Fellowship Grants Under the Federal Income Tax,"
43 Am. Ass'n Univ. Prof. Bull. 65 (1957).
87 Int. Rev. Code of 1954 § 117(b)(1). See generally Chommie, supra note 80,
at 376.
88 Treas. Reg. § 1.117-2(a)(1) (1956).
89 Ibid. See Weiss, "Taxability of Scholarships and Fellowship Grants," 1963 Duke
LU. 488, 495.
90 The Service defines a degree candidate in the following manner:
The term "candidate for a degree" means an individual, whether an undergradu-
ate or a graduate, who is pursuing studies or conducting research to meet the
requirements for an academic or professional degree conferred by colleges or
universities. It is not essential that such study or research be pursued or con-
ducted at an educational institution which confers such degrees if the purpose
thereof is to meet the requirements for a degree of a college or university which
does confer such degrees. A student who receives a scholarship for study at a
secondary school or other educational institution is considered to be a "candidate
for a degree."
Treas. Reg. § 1.117-3(e) (1956).
91 Int. Rev. Code of 1954 § 117(b) (2). See Oliver, supra note 86.
92 For a discussion of § 501(c) (3) organizations, see Brodsky & Krasnowiecski, "Com-
ment on the Patman Report," 112 U. Pa. L. Rev. 119 (1963); Frank, "Taxation of
Charitable Trusts-Section 501(c) (3) Organizations and Aspects of the Patman Report,"
42 Taxes 36 (1964); Sugarman, "Charitable Giving Developments in Tax Planning and
Policy," 39 Taxes 1027 (1961); Sugarman & Pomeroy, "Business Income of Exempt
Organizations," 46 Va. L. Rev. 424 (1960); Toll, "Tax Problems in Connection with
Contributions to Colleges," 14 U. So. Cal. 1962 Tax Inst. 859.
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months.9 3 The application of this basically simple limitation can be-
come very complicated.94
Although the definition of a "scholarship" clearly is "an amount
paid to or allowed to, or for the benefit of, a student, whether an under-
graduate or a graduate, to aid such individual in pursuing his studies,"
the definition of a "fellowship grant" is less clear. 5 A scholarship in-
cludes the value of contributed services and accommodations as well as
any fees or charges for matriculation or tuition.96 However, the Trea-
sury has ruled that where a granting institution adds an allowance for
dependents to the grant, the total amount received is subject to limita-
tions on excludability; also excluded is "any amount provided by an
individual to aid a relative, friend, or other individual ... where the
grantor is motivated by family or philanthropic considerations.197
Amounts paid to aid an individual in the pursuit of study of re-
search are "fellowship grants," and, as a practical matter, are generally
applied to graduate students.98 If the amounts paid represent compen-
sation for past, present, or future employment services or for services
which are subject to the grantor's direction or supervision, they are
taxable,99 and the award may not include any amounts paid to enable
the individual to pursue studies or research primarily for the grantor's
benefit. However, neither of these restrictions apply-thus qualifying
the amount as a fellowship grant-if the primary purpose of the award
is to further the pursuit of the education and training of the recipient
in his individual capacity.' 0
From the foregoing definitions of "scholarships," being the all-
inclusive generic term applicable to student financial aid, and "fellow-
93 Int. Rev. Code of 1954 § 117(b) (2) (B) ; Treas. Reg. § 1.117-2(b) (2) (ii) (1956).
94 Mansfield, supra note 78, at 142.
95 The Treasury Regulations define a "fellowship grant" to mean "an amount paid
or allowed to, or for the benefit of, an individual to aid him in the pursuit of study or
research." Treas. Reg. § 1.117-3(c) "(1960).
96 Int. Rev. Code of 1954 § 117(a) (1).
97 Treas. Reg. § 1.117-3(a) (1956); Rev. Rul. 55-554, 1955-2 Cum. Bull. 36.
98 Weiss, supra note 89, at 493.
99 Treas. Reg. § 1.117-4(c)(1) (1956). See Gordon, "I.R.S.'s Use of Gift-v.-Com-
pensation Test Delays Practical Fellowship Income Rule," 13 J. Taxation 272, 273
(19,60).
100 Treas. Reg. § 1.117-4(c)(2). See Note, "Fellowship Grants Under the Internal
Revenue Code of 1954," 8 Buffalo L. Rev. 286, 288 (1959). In the case of Wrobleski v.
Bingler, 161 F. Supp. 901 (W.D. Pa. 1958), the taxpayer, a graduate physician, was
permitted to exclude $3,400 as a fellowship over the Commissioner's argument that the
stipend was payment for treating and counseling patients at the clinic. Wrobleski was
not a candidate for a degree, but was one of a number of participants in a graduate
course leading to a certificate in psychiatry.
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ship grants," it should become immediately apparent that they will not
be helpful in separating such educational allowances from any pay-
ments for services, gifts, prizes, and awards. Stipends for research or
study are given today in many and varied forms, and while the exclu-
sion of scholarships has not been a source of great difficulty,'' the
determination of what constitutes a fellowship grant has resulted in
litigation because of the restrictive attitude on the part of the Internal
Revenue Service. It should not be overlooked that although an award
may not qualify as an exclusion under section 117, it may, nevertheless,
be deductible by the recipient as an educational expense.102
It appears that the Internal Revenue Service, in practice, is revert-
ing to its pre-1954 Code test and is still applying the test of "gift v.
compensation" set out in its earlier 1951 ruling.1 3 Without concerning
itself primarily with the intent of the recipient who is receiving the
award, it is defeating the purpose of the provision inserted in the 1954
Code to give vitality to these educational grants, and instead continues
to concentrate in its interpretations on the grantor's purpose and reason
for making the grant. An examination of the language of the Code and
its legislative history would appear to indicate that the thrust of the
Commissioner's inquiry is in the wrong direction.0 4
In Frank Thomas Bachmura,° 5 the Commissioner's Regulations
were so attacked. Bachmura, a Ph.D., was engaged by a university to
perform services on a research project in economics under a grant from
the Rockefeller Foundation. He was a nondegree candidate who de-
voted three-fourths of his time to research and one-fourth to teaching.
Bachmura argued that the Regulations erroneously interpreted the
intent of Congress as expressed in the statute and the committee re-
ports. The Tax Court summarily disposed of this argument, stating
that the Regulations were reasonable interpretations and that the grant
was in the nature of compensation for employment rather than for the
furtherance of the grantee's education and training in his individual
101 Huberman, "Scholarships, Fellowships and Prizes," 3 Hastings L.J. 116 (1952).
Professor Gordon says that the difficulty is still there and that "it may be said that
the value of Section 117 lies not in providing a solution to the problem but rather in its
recognition that scholarships and fellowships are sufficiently unique in terms of their
social function and in the framework in which they are employed to merit treatment
separate from that accorded gifts and compensation." Gordon, supra note 99, at 272.
102 Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5 (1958).
103 What Congress has done under the 1954 Code is little more than to change the
focus of attention in this area from donative intent to employment. Chommie,
supra note 80, at 377.
104 See H.R. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 16-17, A37-A38 (1954). S. Rep. No. 1622,
83d Cong., 2d Sess. 17-18, 188-90 (1954). See also Zucker, supra note 83, at 382.
105 32 T.C. 1117 (1959).
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capacity. The restrictive position of the Internal Revenue Service was,
therefore, given considerable support by the language of the Tax Court
in this case.
A recent case,10 6 and a recent announcement of the Treasury,'0 7
however, present a glimmer of hope for grant recipients. In Chandler
P. Bhalla, the court held exempt a "research grant" from the National
Science Foundation funds made to a candidate for a graduate degree at
the University of Tennessee upon the ground that the award constituted
a fully exempt "scholarship."'0 8 What makes this decision noteworthy
is the fact that the Tax Court looked at the question of taxability from
the point of view of the recipient of the award, rather than from the
perspective of the granting organization; and if the present distinction
between grants for training (excludable) and research (included and
taxable) is eliminated, the use of such grants as a part of the educa-
tional process will be more consonant with the legislative policy of the
1954 Code.
THE FUTURE ECONOMICS OF LEGAL EDUCATION
It has been statistically indicated that 69 percent of the children
presently below eighteen years of age are expected by their parents to
go to college.' While this figure must be discounted to allow for the
pride and optimism of most parents, it does demonstrate that a college
education has come td be widely regarded in our society as the sine qua
non of personal success, just as the high school education was years
ago. We can expect that a growing number of qualified young people
will seek a college education. 110 Calculations indicate that by 1970, an
annual expenditure of 10 billion dollars must be made if higher educa-
tion is to meet the surging demand with a quality product.",
As we have already noted, comparatively few opportunities for
financial support of legal study exist because of the lack of funds avail-
able for law scholarships." 2 The sciences and engineering provide far
106 Chandler P. Ehalla, 35 T.C. 13 (1960).
107 T.I.R. 482, 1963 Int. Rev. Bull. No. 25.
108 Prior to Bhalla, the Service had been quite ready to qualify "training grants"
for the exclusion, while governmental and private "research grants" were generally con-
sidered to result in the receipt of taxable income. Grants were disqualified because of
the rendering of required services. Note, "The Taxability of Scholarships and Fellow-
ship Grants: A Student Guide," 39 Notre Dame Law. 301, 307 (1964).
1109 Coombs, "An Economist's Overview of Education," Financing Higher Education:
1960-1970, 15 (1959).
110 U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, "Current Population
Reports, Population Estimates, Illustrative Projections of the Population of the United
States, by Ages and Sex, 1960 to 1980," Series P-25, No. 187 (Nov. 10, 1958).
111 Coombs, supra note 109, at 2.
112 Dean Griswold of the Harvard Law School has said:
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more financial aid to their entering graduate students. However, it has
been noted that one of the reasons for the scarcity of such money in
the law schools is that they have the highest proportion of their student
enrollment coming from relatively affluent families." 3
It has been estimated that if law colleges were to continue to grad-
uate the same percentage of total enrollments as of 1957, the number
of persons "will more than double during the next fifteen years."' 14 In
general, law schools have thus far been able to postpone consideration
of the enrollment problem, but some of the law schools in Florida and
Michigan have recently changed their calendars." 5 Law school enroll-
ments will no doubt move sharply upward in the later 1960's.
While a much higher proportion of law students will be enrolled
in state-supported law schools with modest tuitions, and although
many of them will probably live at home, their parents will still be
under financial pressures to assist their children in obtaining a law
degree. Despite the affluence of many parents of law students, many
students need substantial amounts of financial aid at the present
time.1 0 However, much more detailed and reliable information is
needed before any judgment can be formed as the extent of the need.
Financing a college education, despite rising incomes, is becoming
a serious problem for more and more families. College fees are rising
and larger numbers of students are coming from lower and middle-
income families. For the typical middle-income family, the total cost
of a residential college education for two children approximates two
We think little of putting $10,000,000 or more into a cyclotron, while my school
[Harvard] has for years had extreme difficulty in raising $25,000 a year to
cover the costs of a remarkable and productive basic research into the causes
of juvenile delinquency and the effectiveness of present methods of dealing with
that vastly important problem.
Griswold, "Educating Lawyers for a Changing World: A Challange to Our Law Schools,"
37 A.B.A.J. 805, 808 (1951).
113 Lawyers in the making: The 1961 Entrants to American Law Schools 73
(Warkov ed. 1963); Toepfer, "Tomorrow's Lawyers-Cause for Concern?" 48 A.B.A.J.
945, 946 (1962).
"14 Joiner, "The Coming Deluge: How Goes Our Ark?" 9 J. Legal Ed. 466, 472
(1957). See also Hervey, "Law School Registration, 1962," 15 J. Legal Ed. 210 (1962).
115 Cavers, "A Proposal: Legal Education in Two Calendar Years," 49 A.B.A.J.
475 (1963). Professor Cavers predicts marked increases in evening law courses. The matter
of part-time legal education has been the subject of a great deal of concern and soul-
searching by legal educators. See American Ass'n of Law Schools, Program and Reports
of Committees, Report of Special Committee on Part-time Legal Education 127
(1961). See also Tinnelly & Cheatham, Part-time Legal Education-A Study of the
Problems of Evening Law Schools (1957).
116 See generally Nicholson, The Law Schools of the United States (1958).
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years of income.117 When more than one child is in college, the pay-
ment of the full amount out of current income during a four-year
period is usually impossible. While we have indicated the highest pro-
portion of law student enrollment comes from the relatively affluent
families, we must add the cost of an additional three-year period to the
pre-legal investment already incurred, which tends to have an offsetting
effect for both groups.
In recent years, a great deal of effort has gone into surveys
among high school graduates to find out how many able students do
not go on to college and why they do not."8 In general, these studies
have shown that the probability of a student's going to college is
strongly related to his ability, his sex, and his parents' education or
occupation."19 It would also seem that there are more brilliant children
who have been unable to obtain college educations due to family finan-
cial hardship. 20
The American consumers may know how to spread the cost of
their home or auto, but most of them have not yet learned how to
finance what is perhaps the most important investment they will ever
make-a college and law school education.'2
Financial institutions are attempting to develop new financial
practices to facilitate student borrowing for law school training,2 but
students are reluctant to saddle themselves with a fixed repayment
obligation. To a lesser extent, potential lenders have been reluctant to
make investments where the risk is so highly variable and subjective
and where arrangements for repayment over a long period of years are
so tenuous and potentially costly. Many of our larger universities find
that student loans are going begging, which seems to indicate that some-
117 Coombs, supra note 109, at 28.
118 The most important national study is reported in Cole, Encouraging Scientific
Talent, New York College Entrance Examination Board 1956; Educational Testing
Service, Background Factors Relating to College Plans and College Enrollment Among
Public High School Students (April 1957).
119 Rivlin, "Research in the Economics of Higher Education: Progress and Prob-
lems," Economics of Higher Education 357, 374 (Mushkin ed. 1962).
120 Hearings Before the Committee on Ways and Means, House of Representatives,
General Revenue Revision, 83d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, 187 (1953). It is estimated that
only one-half of the upper 30% in high school graduating classes finish college. See
Golsom, "Who Should Pay for American Higher Education?" Economics of Higher
Education 195, 199 (Mushkin ed. 1962).
121 Coombs, supra note 109, at 29. See Meck, "The Tax Credit Proposal," Higher
Education in the United States: The Economic Problems 76, 95 (Harris ed. 1960).
122 See generally Eckaus, "Education and Economic Growth," Economics of Higher
Education 102 (Mushkin ed. 1962); Vickrey, "A Proposal for Student Loans," Economics
of Higher Education 268 (Mushkin ed. 1962).
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thing is wrong with the terms on which these loans are being made
available. 3
The problems of financing legal education relate to the law school
itself as well as the student. On the one hand, financial aid to the in-
stitution may be used to reduce the costs that are passed on to the
student; on the other, financial aid to the student may be passed back
to the school to defray costs. In either case the aid would seem to be
used to meet the same costs.124
Most colleges and law schools have only the roughest idea of the
actual costs of rendering their various educational and noneducational
services. Although tuition charges continue to go up for students in
both publicly and privately sponsored institutions, higher education in
the United States is poorly financed at the present time.12 5 This is most
strikingly attested by authoritative findings that its faculty members-
who are its most critical element-are on the average only about half
as well paid as they should be.'2 6
There is no single "right formula" for the successful financing of
legal education in the United States. To get the job done tolerably well,
many different methods must be used to meet the problems of an
enormous diversity of legal institutions with widely varying academic
and financial requirements.
FEDERAL TAXATION OF LEGAL EDUCATION
A recent decision may prompt Congress to take further action to
codify a clear and unambiguous construction of the Internal Revenue
123 The National Defense Education Act, passed during the dosing days of Con-
gress in 1958, provides long-term student loans administered by educational institutions
with 90% of the funds being advanced by the federal government, permitting needy
students to stay in college once they get there. It has been recommended that the present
feature which forgives indebtedness up to 50% of the loans to those who become public
school teachers should be eaKtended to include all school and college teachers. Golsom,
op. cit. supra note 120, at 200.
124 But see Millett, Financing Higher Education in the United States 417 (1952),
where it is pointed out that there "is a great difference in procedure and implication,
however, between programs which give financial aid to the individual student and those
which aid the educational institution."
125 Coombs, supra note 109, at 2. Law Schools throughout the United States are
suffering from financial starvation. Harno, Legal Education in the United States 134
(1953).
126 The President's Committee on Education Beyond the High School estimated
in 1957 that the average faculty salaries would have to be increased by 75-80% to
restore teaching to a competitive position in the professional labor market; to maintain
this position, once restored, would require additional increases. The Committee recom-
mended doubling the average salaries in 5-10 years. U.S. President's Committee on
Education Beyond the High School, Second Report to the President 6 (1957).
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Code and Treasury Regulations relating to the deductibility of expenses
leading to a law degree.127 In Welsh v. United States,-" an Internal
Revenue agent enrolled as a degree candidate at a night law school. He
claimed expense deductions on his income tax returns for amounts ex-
pended during the three-year period for tuition and books. The tax-
payer was admitted to the Ohio Bar in June 1960. Shortly thereafter,
he left the employ of the Treasury Department for a position in private
law practice. The Commissioner disallowed the taxpayer's claim for
refund on the theory that the expenses were incurred for the primary
purpose of obtaining a new skill. The district court held that since the
taxpayer's primary motive was to improve and maintain his existing
skills, his educational expenses were deductible.
In recent years, the Internal Revenue Service has taken the posi-
tion that expenditures for expenses in undertaking law courses that re-
sult in the taxpayer receiving a Bachelor of Laws degree are not
deductible, contending that the expenditures are personal in nature and
undertaken to acquire a new skill. 29 The deduction is denied whether
or not the taxpayer's employer requires the taxpayer to obtain an
undergraduate degree. 3
The Tax Court in Louis Aronin'3' refused the tax deduction for a
legal education to a labor management relations examiner employed by
the National Labor Relations Board where there was no job require-
ment calling for a legal education since it also found the expenditures
were undertaken to acquire a new skill not required by the employer.
In Sandt v. Commissioner,32 a research chemist, who took law school
courses to qualify for promotions to patent chemist, could not deduct
127 Note, "Deductibility of the Expenses of Obtaining a Law Degree," 17 U. Miami
L. Rev. 424 (1963).
128 210 F. Supp. 597 (N.D. Ohio 1962). See generally Comment, "Law School
Education Expenses After Welsh v. United States," 11 Loyola L. Rev. 307 (1963).
129 Note, "Income Tax Deduction of Educational Expenses," 11 U. Fla. L. Rev. 329,
336 (1958).
130 Rev. Rul. 60-97, 1960-1 Cum. Bull. 69. In example (10) a trust officer in a
bank undertook to study law. Although the Treasury concedes that the law will be
helpful in discharging the duties of the trust officer, the taxpayer is pursuing a complete
course of education in law which will lead toward qualifying in a new field and thus
may not deduct his school expense. What if the bank imposed this legal training upon
him as a condition of his continued employment? The Treasury, in example (10), says
it is still not deductible "because the requirement is considered to be imposed primarily
for the employee's benefit and not primarily for a bona fide business purpose of the
employer."
131 20 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 909 (1961).
132 303 F.2d 111 (3d Cir. 1962), affirtning Bernd W. Sandt, 20 CCH Tax Ct. Mem.
913 (1961). Accord, John Lezdey, T.C. Memo 1964-78; Robert H. Montgomery, T.C.
Memo. 1964-101.
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the law school expenses because the Third Circuit Court of Appeals, in
affirming the decision of the Tax Court, believed the costs to be per-
sonal in nature and not required by the taxpayer's employer. Certified
public accountants have been denied 3 ' and granted" 4 a deduction for
the costs of books and law school courses.
Despite the new favorable decision in Welsh supporting the posi-
tion of the taxpayer (the holding has been affirmed by the Sixth Circuit
Court of Appeals 3 '), there have since been other cases which reiterated
the fundamental position of the Commissioner denying such deductions.
An Internal Revenue agent, James J. Engel, had his expenses of a legal
education disallowed 36 on grounds that becoming a lawyer was not
required by the Treasury Department of persons in the classification
of field examiner. 1 37 In James I. Condit,3 ' a construction company
employee who handled workmen's compensation claims and negotiated
supply contracts, was denied a deduction for his legal education ex-
penses. Although the taxpayer maintained that his legal studies were
for the primary purpose of improving his present skills, the Tax Court
found that his principal purpose was that of becoming a lawyer. The
Sixth Circuit affirmed the Tax Court's denial of the deduction on the
same day that it affirmed Welsh in granting the legal education tax
deduction to the taxpayer.
In addition to the Treasury Regulations issued by the Internal
Revenue Service dealing with the deductibility of education expenses
generally,3 9 a ruling has also been promulgated which states that a
course of study leading to a Bachelor of Laws degree qualifies a tax-
payer in a new trade or business or specialty and that such education
will be considered as having been undertaken to qualify the taxpayer
in a new trade or business or specialty. 40 It now appears, however,
that Welch will add to the confusion by making the deductibility of
133 Anthony E. Spitaleri, 32 T.C. 988 (1959).
134 Walter T. Charlton, T.C. Memo 1964-59.
135 Welch v. United States, 329 F.2d 145 (6th Cir. 1964), affirming 210 F. Supp. 597
(N.D. Ohio 1962).
136 James J. Engel, 21 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1302 (1962).
137 Contra, Douglas R. Fortnery, 64-1 U.S. Tax Cas. § 9489. The educational ex-
penses of an examiner in the Estate and Gift Tax Division of the Internal Revenue
Service in taking a summer course in tax accounting and attending law school were
held to be deductible since the education was undertaken to maintain and improve his
skill as an examiner in the Estate and Gift Division. The district court also held that a
legal education was customary for those qualifying as examiners in the Estate and Gift
Division, but that taxpayer's particular grade as an examiner did not require a law degree.
138 21 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1306 (1962), aff'd, 64-1 U.S. Tax Cas. § 9317.
139 Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5 (1958).
140 Rev. Rul. 60-97, 1960-1 Cum. Bull. 69.
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legal education expenses depend primarily on the subjective intent of
the taxpayer. Now legal education is nondeductible except in the case
of bank trust officers, certified public accountants, insurance ad-
justers,141 patent lawyers, chemists, and other persons who are engaged
in occupations in which the knowledge of the law would be helpful, not
required.
Every tax exemption has been said to be equivalent to a govern-
ment expenditure, and it has been suggested that each new tax "loop-
hole" should be charged against the budget of the appropriate depart-
ment of government. 42 In any event, we should recognize the need for
extraordinary justification if a new deduction is to be allowed.
In recent years many proposals have been advanced for deduc-
tions or credits under the income tax law for certain educational ex-
penditures.'43 Most of these proposals are intended to grant tax relief
to parents of college students. In 1953 the House Ways and Means
Committee selected college and education expenses as one of the forty
topics for study in preparation for revision of the Internal Revenue
Code.' 44 The President's Committee on Education Beyond the High
School recommended in 1957 that:
the Federal revenue laws be revised, with appropriate safeguards, in
ways which will permit deductions or credits on income tax returns
by students, their parents or others, who contribute to meeting the
expenditures necessarily incurred in obtaining formal education be-
yond high school; and further, that provisions be included which
will grant proportionately greater tax benefit to those least able to
afford these expenditures. 145
Both major political parties included in their 1960 platforms a
statement favoring consideration of means through tax laws to help
offset tuition cost without specifying the form of assistance. 46
As mentioned above, our tax laws make no provision for current
or future deductions for expenditures incurred for education or train-
ing undertaken to prepare oneself for a vocation or profession, or to
141 Richard M. Baum, 23 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 200 (1964).
142 McKenna, "Tax Loopholes: A Procedural Proposal," 16 Natl Tax J. 63, 65
(1963).
143 Note, "Federal Tax Incentives for Higher Education," 76 Harv. L. Rev. 369,
379 (1962).
144 Hearings Before the Committee on Ways and Means, House of Representatives,
General Revenue Revision, 83d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 177-201 (1953).
145 President's Committee on Education Beyond the High School, Second Report to
the President 11 (1957).
146 Roberts, 1960 Platforms of the Democratic and the Republican Parties 68
(U.S. House of Representatives, September 1960).
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meet the minimum requirements for any employment. The Code 4 ' and
Regulations, 48 while permitting expenditures for certain kinds of sup-
plementary continuation or refresher courses previously illustrated,
have created confusion in this oft-litigated area and this uncertainty
has prompted requests for clarification and tax reform. 49 While deduc-
tions will ordinarily be allowed for the cost of education for maintain-
ing or improving skills,"" the taxpayer must first determine whether it
is customary for other established members of the taxpayer's trade or
business to undertake such education. 5'
THE CAPITALIZATION AND AmORTIZATION OF THE EXPENSES
OF LEGAL EDUCATION
Our Government has too long delayed in doing the fair and just
act of placing professional people on the same basis as business and
industry."' The income tax laws are presently at variance from the
commonly accepted and deep-rooted belief of the American people that
our high standards of living and our national welfare are geared to and
dependent upon our being an educated people. 53 In recent years there
have been many studies and reports by distinguished bodies emphasiz-
ing the above point, 54 citing particularly the importance of legal educa-
tion as well as graduate work in the field of higher education. 5 '
Senator Abraham Ribicoff lost a close battle in 1964 on his tax-
147 Int. Rev. Code of 1954 § 162.
148 Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5(a) (1958).
149 Chommie, "Federal Income Taxation: Transactions in Aid of Education," 48
Dick. L. Rev. 291, 324 (1954); Harrington, "The Deductibility of Educational Expenses
Under § 162(a) of the Internal Revenue Code," 4 William & Mary L. Rev. 55, 65 (1963);
Loring, "Some Tax Problems of Students and Scholars," 45 Calif. L. Rev. 153, 167
(1957).
150 Donald Frazee, 22 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1086 (1963).
151 Hagendorf, "Tax Court, in Watson, Interprets New Education Expense Regu-
lations Broadly," 11 J. Taxation 226 (1959); Steutzer, "New Cases on Travel, Education,
Help Draw Line Between Personal and Business," 11 J. Taxation 346 (1959).
152 See generally Kahn, Personal Deductions in the Federal Income Tax (1960).
153 Becker, "Underinvestment in College Education," 50 Am. Econ. Rev. 346, 348
(1960); Schultz, "Investment in Human Capital," 51 Am. Econ. Rev. 1, 2 (1961).
154 Auerback, The Legal Process--An Introduction to Decision Making (1961);
Cavers, "Recent Issues in Legal Education," 11 Clev.-Mar. L. Rev. 385 (1962);
Emerson, "Postadmission Education to Lawyers at Medium-Sized and Smaller Law
Schools," 9 J. Legal Ed. 372 (1956); Fordham, "Legal Education and the Advancement
of Law, Legal Institutions and Legal Processes," 13 J. Legal Ed. 172 (1960); Goldberg,
"New Frontiers for Lawyers and the Law," 45 J. Am. Jud. Soc'y 56 (1961); Mayo,
"The New Technology and National Goals: Some Implications for Legal-Policy Decision
Making," 37 Notre Dame Law. 33 (1961).
155 Hearings, supra note 144, at 180.
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credit plan, but promised to renew the fight.156 Under the bill, parents
would have been allowed a credit against the tax of up 325 dollars a
year for payment of tuition, other fees, books, and supplies."" A con-
siderably greater part of the total tax reduction would accrue to low-
income and middle-income families under a tax credit than under any
deduction plan, and should cost our Government the same amount of
revenue.
158
In addition to the tax-credit plan, it has recently been proposed
that expenses of education should be permitted to be capitalized and
amortized against the future earnings derived therefrom by tax-
payers.159
Richard Goode, a senior staff member of the Brookings Institu-
tion, appears to have revived a proposal made in 1953, permitting a
tax-free recovery of educational outlays. Under the original plan an
annual deduction would be allowed against employment, e.g., teachers
and professors, or self-employment, e.g., doctors, and lawyers, income
in an amount not exceeding the lesser of 10 percent of the cost or 25
percent of the actual employment income for the year involved. Any
amount that would still remain after the ten years would still be avail-
able to be written off under the same rules of deduction.
Taxpayers who had already started on their careers and who were
subsequently taking refresher and seminar courses' 60 would have an
option, as does business, of either fully deducting the expense in the
year incurred, or adding it to the unamortized basic education expense.
In order to obtain this amortization deduction, a taxpayer would be
required to be employed in some field utilizing this education. 6' In
156 N.Y. Times, February 5, 1964, p. 1, col. 2. For a detailed examination of the
tax-credit proposal introduced originally by John F. Meck, Vice President and Treasurer
of Dartmouth College, see Hearings Before the Committee on Ways and Means, House
of Representatives, General Revenue Revision, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 1061 (1958).
157 Meck, "The Tax Credit Proposal," Higher Education in the United States 93
(Harris ed. 1960).
158 Goode, "Educational Expenditures and the Income Tax," Economics in Higher
Education 301 (Mushkin ed. 1962.)
159 Ibid.
160 In 1959, New York University had 750 Lawyers in attendance in one or more
of the 130 graduate courses or seminars. Tweed, "Continuing Legal Education and the
Law Schools," 27 Tenn. L. Rev. 338, 341 (1960); Stumpf, "Continuing Legal Education:
Its Role in Tomorrow's Practice of the Law," 49 A.B.A.J. 248 (1963). Education for
practicing lawyers is still in its infancy. Horowitz, "Graduate Study for the Practicing
Lawyer," 4 J. Legal Ed. 196 (1951); Stumpf, "Practical Problems in Continuing Legal
Education," Prac. Law. 8 (April 1960).
161 "A precise measure of earning capacity would not be required, but merely an
indication whether a significant influence could reasonably be expected on the basis of the
experience of other persons who have acquired similar education, or other evidence."
Goode, supra note 158, at 287.
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addition, his deduction would be limited to the amount of earnings
directly attributable to this educational capital without reference to
any other income that the taxpayer derives from other sources.
Emphasis is placed on the purpose of the expenditure, rather than
on its merits.'62 Expenditures for ordinary high school studies would be
classified as personal expenses and nondeductible, but part-time studies
and correspondence courses could be eligible for capitalization. Stu-
dents at colleges and universities, as defined by the Office of Education,
would qualify regardless of whether they obtained degrees or not.
The proposal also provides for an alternative method of treatment
of this investment in "human capital."16 The personal costs of different
kinds of education could be fragmented, giving weighted values to
different kinds of education with the objective of reflecting differences
in the normal contribution to future earnings of the taxpayer. For
example, Mr. Goode divides the proportions to be capitalized as fol-
lows: (a) 75 percent for general college and university studies, (b)
100 percent for professional schools, postgraduate courses, and voca-
tional training, and (c) 25 percent for high school courses.
Although foregone earnings of students are a large part of the real
cost of education,'64 these earnings which students do not realize while
they are attending school would not be added for tax purposes to the
unamortized human capital accounts. However, in lieu thereof, a small
fixed allowance for additional living expenses might be permitted to
students living away from home and attending nonresidential colleges
or universities. No deduction would be granted for normal living ex-
penses since these would be incurred in any event.
The deduction could be allowed in full, if the taxpayer should die
before the end of the amortization period, in the same manner as we
now permit depreciable property to be written off when it suddenly
loses its usefulness. 6 ' Should the deduction in such cases reduce the
income of the decedent's estate or of the decedent to below zero, a
carry back or net loss might be authorized and a refund of income
taxes for previous years granted. The same equitable and nondis-
criminatory treatment of human investment could be justified in those
cases where the taxpayer became totally and permanently disabled.
While Mr. Goode admits that the adoption of his plan allowing
educational expenditures to be written off against taxable income would
162 Professor Theodore Schultz, of the University of Chicago, however, suggests
that educational expenditures be classified by reference to their influence on earnings
rather than by reference to their outlay. Schultz, supra note 153, at 2.
163 Goode, supra note 158, at 290.
164 Schultz, "Capital Formation by Education," 68 J. Pol. Econ. 571 (1960).
165 Int. Rev. Code of 1954 § 167; Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-8 (1956).
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probably encourage colleges and universities to raise their tuition
charges and fees, which is the argument that was made in the Senate
by the opponents of Senator Ribicoff's tax credit proposal, he points
out that it is not until tuition and fees are increased to cover a much
larger fraction of the total educational costs, that the amortization plan
would become more significant. Since the United States Office of Edu-
cation reported that tuition and fees alone, between 1940 and 1957,
increased 89 percent in public colleges and 83 percent in private col-
leges, 16 6 it does not appear we shall have too long to wait.
CONCLUSION
Basic legal education may be presumed to be motivated primarily
by economic considerations, and the same may be said of a refresher
course and any supplementary postgraduate training relating directly
to the practice of law. The connection between such legal education
and earning capacity is fairly clear, and current deduction or amor-
tization could properly be allowed so long as the amounts are rea-
sonable.
The recognition that certain investments in human capital should
be treated, for tax purposes, in a similar and like manner to invest-
ments in physical assets would help to establish an important principle
that is often overlooked- a modern nation, to prosper, needs a tax-
supported school system. Congress has already shown us that it is quite
able to solve the problem of the indefinite and uncertain useful life in
some of the other areas of expense deductions. It has discretion to
award lawyers, doctors, teachers, and other professionals artificial,
amortizable lives.
If it seems strained to treat educated labor as a capital factor, we
need only look to the dictum of Mr. Justice Cardozo. He saw the anal-
ogy of the educational investment to the physical capital utilized in
other areas of endeavor. Perhaps education is more durable than many
forms of nonhuman reproducible capital.
The men who shaped our Constitution clearly felt that federal
aid to higher learning was compatible with our form of government.
No better use can be made of public funds than to establish and sup-
port better educational facilities, and to assist students to take greater
advantage of our institutions of learning. To obviate the danger of
depletion in the ranks of professionals, we suggest that the public cost
of their education, already great, must become even greater. For this,
the government must prepare. The alternative is even less desirable.
166 Hearings, supra note 120, at 1062.
